WASHINGTON—U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, on Wednesday spoke at a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the future of arms control and deterrence in the Middle East. In his questions to Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie D. Jenkins, Murphy emphasized the importance of upholding the “gold standard” in any nuclear agreement reached with Saudi Arabia as part of a normalization deal with Israel. Murphy highlighted the need for dialogue to further regional nonproliferation efforts and pressed the Under Secretary on potential implications of a Saudi domestic enrichment program.

Murphy underscored the necessity of maintaining open channels of communication to further nuclear nonproliferation efforts in today’s nuclear age: “We don't have any choice but to have a policy in which we hope to be able to create the foundation for positive engagement with countries with nuclear programs. That may not be realistic in the short term, but it would be foolhardy in a nuclear age to abandon that prospect. I understand it’s a difficult dialogue because this is a very dire moment, but it is incredibly important for us to understand that whether it be in the medium-term or the long-term, that dialogue is still very, very important, even with our adversaries.”

Murphy emphasized the importance of the “gold standard” 123 agreement in any future Saudi-Israeli normalization deal and raised concerns about the risks of falling short of that standard: “I want to talk to you about the demands reported in the press that Saudi Arabia has made of the United States. What they have told us is that if there is to be a normalization deal with Israel – that we all root for – they would want as a key tenet of that deal the ability to develop a civilian nuclear program inside Saudi Arabia. A number of us have written to the administration to make clear that we believe any agreement would impose and involve what we call the ‘gold standard’ 123 agreement and the Additional Protocol. Nonetheless, Saudi officials have insisted that a deal must include the U.S. construction of a uranium enrichment facility inside its territory. Let me ask you this: would the construction of an enrichment facility inside Saudi Arabia, as currently stipulated and requested by Saudi officials as an element of a potential normalization deal with Israel, be detrimental to our nonproliferation objectives in the region?”

Murphy continued to press Jenkins: “I mean, it stands to reason that if Saudi Arabia does not have the ‘gold standard’ applied, and they are able to do domestic enrichment, then the UAE will want that ability, Qatar will want that ability, and it will impact Iran's decision-making as well. Isn't there clearly a ripple effect in the region if we do not require the application of the gold standard in an agreement with Saudi Arabia? … Isn’t it just common sense? I mean, you can’t say on the record that if Saudi Arabia has the ability to domestically enrich, that would impact the desire of other countries in the region to be able to domestically enrich? They’re not just going to stand down and allow for Saudi Arabia to have the deal with the United States that they don't have.”

A full transcript of his remarks can be found below:

MURPHY: “Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those comments. Listen, we don't have any choice but to have a policy in which we hope to be able to create the foundation for positive engagement with countries with nuclear programs. That may not be realistic in the short term, but it would be foolhardy in a nuclear age to abandon that prospect. I understand it’s a difficult dialogue because this is a very dire moment, but it is incredibly important for us to understand that whether it be in the medium-term or the long-term, that dialogue is still very, very important, even with our adversaries.

“Madam Secretary, I wanted to talk to you about the future of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In particular, I want to talk to you about the demands reported in the press that Saudi Arabia has made of the United States. What they have told us is that if there is to be a normalization deal with Israel – that we all root for – they would want as a key tenet of that deal the ability to develop a civilian nuclear program inside Saudi Arabia.

“A number of us have written to the administration to make clear that we believe any agreement would impose and involve what we call the ‘gold standard’ 123 agreement and the Additional Protocol. Nonetheless, Saudi officials have insisted that a deal must include the U.S. construction of a uranium enrichment facility inside its territory. Let me ask you this: would the construction of an enrichment facility inside Saudi Arabia, as currently stipulated and requested by Saudi officials as an element of a potential normalization deal with Israel, be detrimental to our nonproliferation objectives in the region?”

JENKINS: “Yes, thank you for the question. And just very briefly on the previous one, I also want to make clear that while we are also doing our job to make sure there is diplomatic engagement, we also have a whole-of-government approach, which is also the deterrence side which I’m not necessarily going to go into. But we keep track of all of these things, on both diplomacy and deterrence, two sides of the same coin.

“Thank you very much for your question, Senator Murphy. We have had discussions with Saudi Arabia for many years in terms of a 123 agreement. We’ve been engaging with them off and on. And of course, finding ways that we could promote stability in the Middle East, our relationship with Israel and other countries in the Middle East is very paramount to us. So, we continue to have conversations with Saudi Arabia on this issue. Unfortunately, I can't get into all the details about the discussions of what is happening on that issue, but I can say that we continue to have these conversations with them on a potential 123 agreement.”

MURPHY: “Well, let me ask you the question this way then. If Saudi Arabia were to have the ability to do domestic enrichment, what would be the impact of that decision, in the context of a normalization agreement, on other allies in the region? I mean, it stands to reason that if Saudi Arabia does not have the ‘gold standard’ applied, and they are able to do domestic enrichment, then the UAE will want that ability, Qatar will want that ability, and it will impact Iran's decision-making as well. Isn't there clearly a ripple effect in the region if we do not require the application of the gold standard in an agreement with Saudi Arabia?”

JENKINS: “What I can say – there is not much that I can go into in detail – is that in these conversations that we have, we do look at the regional context. As we do in all these situations, we do look at decisions that we make and how it can be affected in the region and how other countries will interpret it. So, I can say that. I can’t really go into any more detail than that, unfortunately.”

MURPHY: “But I mean isn’t it just common sense? I mean, you can’t say on the record that if Saudi Arabia has the ability to domestically enrich that would impact the desire of other countries in the region to be able to domestically enrich? They’re not just going to stand down and allow for Saudi Arabia to have the deal with the United States that they don't have.”

JENKINS: “Yeah, I mean what I can say, as you’re saying, is that’s certainly something we are considering and we’re thinking about in terms of what we are working on with Saudi Arabia and how any decisions that we make with them will impact other countries in the region and how they’re looking at the situation.”

MURPHY: “Have you seen any evidence that Saudi Arabia is taking steps towards developing enrichment capabilities outside an agreement with the United States?”

JENKINS: “I’ll have to get back to you on that, because I’m not aware of any but I can’t say that that is not the case.”

MURPHY: “Okay, I think that it would be more constructive for us to have a bit more of an open conversation about this incredibly vital issue. I think you are punting the discussion around the details, but everybody knows this discussion is happening between the United States and Saudi Arabia about a potential major new enrichment capability for the Saudis. I don’t think it’s helpful to not be able to have an open, non-classified debate about that inside of this committee, and I hope that this committee will continue to pursue that dialogue with the administration. I don’t think it’s helpful to withhold any level of detail about those conversations, which are very real and active. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.”

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