WASHINGTON–U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism held a hearing on President Biden’s fiscal year 2025 funding request for the Middle East and North Africa with Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and Jeanne Pryor, Deputy Assistant Administrator of USAID’s Middle East Bureau.

Murphy highlighted the Biden administration’s leadership in the Middle East in a particularly tumultuous period: “From the unconscionable terrorist attacks of October 7th to increasing threats to traffic in the Red Sea to the spiraling humanitarian disaster inside Gaza to rising tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border to the unforeseen transition of power in Iran, the Middle East has been in an unusual amount of tumult and violence since the subcommittee last met to review the State Department's regional budget. Amidst this chaos, I have one thought that dominates all others: thank goodness at this moment that we have Joe Biden's steady hand on the wheel. Since October 7, President Biden and his team, including our witnesses, in particular Secretary Leaf, have been tirelessly working the phones and crisscrossing the region to secure a comprehensive deal that ends the conflict in Gaza and releases the hostages.”

Murphy emphasized the importance of eliminating Hamas’ ability to launch another attack on Israel as well as planning for what comes next in Gaza, including a Palestinian state: “But just as important as bringing the violence to an end is planning for the day after, because without a plan for how to rebuild and secure Gaza under viable new political leadership, terrorist groups like Hamas are just going to fill the vacuum, feeding on the despair of the Palestinian people and posing a continued threat to Israel. It's no secret that right now there is not a viable plan for the day after in Gaza…Part of this day-after plan has to include the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Not just vague promises of a ‘pathway’ to a state that never really come to fruition, but a concrete, irreversible timeline that culminates in statehood for the Palestinian people.”

On his skepticism with recent reporting on the U.S.-Saudi bilateral elements of a potential normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, Murphy said: “Normalized relations would be a very good thing. Reports suggest, though, that the price the Saudis are seeking for such an agreement is a NATO-like security guarantee from the United States as well as control over the [full] cycle of nuclear enrichment. That is an extraordinarily high price to command. And I am skeptical that such commitments would ultimately benefit the United States. We only give those commitments to our most trusted allies, and over and over again, most recently, just last week, when the Saudis refused to sign the Ukraine peace statement, we watch as Saudi Arabia plays us off against our adversaries.”

Murphy also emphasized the consequences of withholding U.S. funding for UNRWA and underscored the urgency of a comprehensive resolution to the conflict: “Most countries, almost without exception, that had temporarily turned off funding for UNRWA as the investigation was ongoing have started that funding again, and I just don't understand how these fragile places like Jordan, Lebanon and Syria survive if UNRWA has only two months of funding at any given time without the United States playing a role, and without, frankly, a lot of our Gulf allies stepping up and filling the vacuum.”

On the broader regional imperative to secure a permanent ceasefire in Gaza: We have the outlines of a very important potential agreement in Lebanon to be able to move Hezbollah back off the border and maybe even get in a conversation about border demarcation. We have a political standstill in Yemen, with the added complication of Houthi provocations into the Red Sea. Both seem static until the Gaza conflict comes to a close. I just think it is important for this committee to understand that the end of the conflict in Gaza is important to be able to ultimately bring about a long-term security settlement with respect to Hamas' ability to hit Israel ever again. But it is also, right now, standing in the way of moving forward on a Yemen political process, on a de-escalation with the Houthis, and on a potential breakthrough in Lebanon.”

Murphy also voiced his skepticism of an Arab-funded force in Gaza: There are lots of smart people in the foreign policy consensus in this town who believe that there is going to be an Arab force, an Arab-funded force. I worry that that greatly misunderstands the risk tolerance of our Arab friends. That certainly, in your head or on paper, makes all sorts of sense for the Saudis and the Emirates, others, to either populate or front a governance structure or a security force. They’ve never been willing to take a chance that big, and it probably overestimates how much they care about the future of the Palestinian people.

On the suspension of funding to UNRWA: Most countries, almost without exception, that had temporarily turned off funding for UNRWA as the investigation was ongoing have started that funding again, and I just don't understand how these fragile places like Jordan, Lebanon and Syria survive if UNRWA has only two months of funding at any given time without the United States playing a role, and without, frankly, a lot of our Gulf allies stepping up and filling the vacuum.

On Egypt’s continued failure to improve human rights conditions, Murphy said: “The State Department waived certification requirements tied to human rights improvements on the $235 million of Egypt’s FY22 FMF. But upon becoming Chair of the full committee, Senator Cardin put a hold on that funding. My impression is that since the Chairman's hold has been in place, the Egyptian government has [not] really failed to engage in any meaningful cooperation with the United States on any of our core interests, and that we have further not seen any real progress with respect to the pretrial detention reforms or the release of significant numbers of political prisoners. It feels like, just like the amount of funding to Egypt has been stuck in place since the mid-1980's, progress with Egypt has been stuck at least for the past six months.”

A full transcript of Murphy’s opening remarks can be found below:

“We are going to convene the subcommittee today to discuss the FY 25 budget request for the Middle East and North Africa. Thank you to our witnesses for being here. We're going to start with some opening statements for myself and the Ranking Member. And then we'll get to statements from witnesses and questions.

“From the unconscionable terrorist attacks of October 7 to increasing threats to traffic in the Red Sea to the spiraling humanitarian disaster inside Gaza to rising tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border to the unforeseen transition of power in Iran, the Middle East has been in an unusual amount of tumult and violence since the subcommittee last met to review the State Department's regional budget.

“Amidst this chaos, I have one thought that dominates all others: thank goodness at this moment that we have Joe Biden's steady hand on the wheel. Since October 7th, President Biden and his team, including our witnesses, in particular Secretary Leaf, have been tirelessly working the phones and crisscrossing the region to secure a comprehensive deal that ends the conflict in Gaza and releases the hostages.

“And let me underscore how critical it is that this conflict come to a close. I want Hamas’ ability to launch another terrorist attack destroyed. I want our sacred ally Israel to live without the threat of violence or attack. And it's important to note that this conflict could end tomorrow if Hamas surrenders, but they won't, because they don't give a damn about the Palestinian people.

“But I do not understand how Israel's current military strategy in Gaza or their current lack of a strategy for what to do once the military campaign ends effectuates either of those goals. Right now, to me, it appears that Israel's Gaza policy is guaranteeing the threats to Israel continue, not that they are eliminated. Leveling Gaza to the ground and unnecessarily killing thousands of innocent civilians in the process, it has a short-term moral cost, but it has a long-term strategic cost. The long-term strategic cost is that the carnage can become a boon to terrorist recruiting. That's what we saw in the aftermath of our invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and I don't understand why we are not learning those lessons.

“But just as important as bringing the violence to an end is planning for the day after because without a plan for how to rebuild and secure Gaza under viable new political leadership, terrorist groups like Hamas are just going to fill the vacuum, feeding on the despair of the Palestinian people and posing a continued threat to Israel. It's no secret that right now there is not a viable plan for the day after in Gaza. I'm glad that the administration is prioritizing planning with regional partners and likeminded allies in the EU and the G7. I'd like to hear more about that today.

“Part of this day after plan has to include the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Not just vague promises of a pathway to a state that never really come to fruition, but a concrete, irreversible timeline that culminates in statehood for the Palestinian people.

“Connected to a Palestinian state are recent discussions between Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. Normalized relations would be a very good thing. Reports suggest, though, that the price the Saudis are seeking for such an agreement is a NATO-like security guarantee from the United States as well as control over the cycle of nuclear enrichment. That is an extraordinarily high price to command. And I am skeptical that such commitments would ultimately benefit the United States.

“We only give those commitments to our most trusted allies, and over and over again, most recently, just last week, when the Saudis refused to sign the Ukraine peace statement, we watch as Saudi Arabia plays us off against our adversaries.

“Pulling back to look at the region more broadly, there are other key questions this committee needs to ask today about how we allocate funding. For instance, does it make sense to habitually renew Egypt's military aid package of $1.3 billion? The exact same amount we have provided every year to Egypt since 1987? Does it make sense to provide just $6.5 million to civil society in Tunisia when those organizations are striving to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in an increasingly forbidding environment? What crisis will we create in Jordan or Syria or Lebanon if we go another year without U.S. funding to UNRWA?

“Now, of course, our assistance dollars can have real impact, and there's no shortage of success stories that we should talk about as well. Support to our Arab partners and to Israel's Iron Dome system were critical in repelling Iran's unprecedented missile and drone attack on April 13th. And in Lebanon, our support for the Lebanese Armed Forces has been instrumental in maintaining stability, as political and economic elites push that country to the brink of collapse. And while there is always room to do more, our humanitarian aid has saved tens of thousands of lives in Gaza, Syria, and Yemen over the last decade.

“So we convene the subcommittee to review the State Department and USAID’s budget in the region at a critical moment, and I look forward to our discussion today.”

A full transcript of Murphy’s exchange with the witnesses can be found below:

MURPHY: “Ambassador Leaf, let me first talk to you about day-after planning in Gaza. The FY25 request largely maintains recent funding levels for the West Bank and Gaza despite the fact that we know we have a huge bill ahead of us. But we can't spend money effectively in Gaza if we don't have a governance structure that keeps Israel safe and understands political realities on the ground in Gaza. My understanding is that Prime Minister Netanyahu has essentially refused to start postwar planning in Gaza, not because he doesn't believe it is important to do so, but because he has pressure from his far-right coalition partners who want to reoccupy Gaza with Jewish settlements. Can you talk for a moment about the status of planning for what the governance structure looks like once this conflict comes to a close? Because we are keeping our fingers crossed that with or without an agreement, we are potentially weeks, maybe a month or two away from the formal military operations coming to a close, and it is just extraordinary that we have no viable plan from the Israeli government as to what comes next.”

LEAF: “Senator, this question of what comes next, what comes after this conflict, is one that we have discussed extensively with our Arab partners, with the Palestinians, with the Israeli government over the course of the last four or five months. And you are right, there is still insufficient planning, to say the least, on the part of the Israeli government. I would say, however, that that has not kept us from doing the work on our side in consulting extensively and also drawing up some concepts that, as Secretary Blinken said last week, we will be prepared to share with partners here shortly. I just got back on Thursday from the trip that the Secretary took to Cairo, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Doha, and I will probably leave again this weekend to continue those discussions and to drill in deeper. But suffice to say there were some essential points of agreement, notwithstanding, and that is that everyone is joined by the resolve to see Hamas removed from a governance role, and a governance role in particular, at the point of a gun. Now how we get there is going to be exceptionally difficult, in no small part because of the conditions that prevail now in Gaza, but we are discussing this with our partners and looking at a variety of different concepts. I don't really want to go into those details in this public setting, because as you can imagine, it’s all pretty sensitive. These get to the heart of politics for every one of these governments, and for the Palestinians and the Israelis as well. But I think reality has a way of pushing even those who can't imagine a concept such as the PA returning to Gaza. Reality has a way of intruding, and I think, as the Secretary frequently says, you can't beat something without something, as an alternative for Palestinians.”

MURPHY: “I understand the sensitivity about discussing particular plans. Let me just share a skepticism with you. There are lots of smart people in the foreign policy consensus in this town who believe that there is going to be an Arab force, an Arab-funded force. I worry that that greatly misunderstands the risk tolerance of our Arab friends. That certainly, in your head or on paper, makes all sorts of sense for the Saudis and the Emirates, others, to either populate or front a governance structure or a security force. They’ve never been willing to take a chance that big, and it probably overestimates how much they care about the future of the Palestinian people.”

LEAF: “I would just say we are intimately acquainted with their thinking on all of this, so I would say there is no magical thinking on the part of this administration. We are well aware of how tough a piece this is. Because we have to remind ourselves, this has been a piece of territory run, ruled, governed, if you will, at the point of a gun for 17 years by a foreign terrorist organization. That is not easy to deconstruct, and we’ve obviously made the point publicly and privately that you can't do it all by military means alone. There will have to be a political alternative, and that is what we are in the process of putting together. These concepts.”

MURPHY: “I'm at the end of questions, but just say a word about the consequences of another year of prohibition on U.S. funding for UNRWA. Most countries, almost without exception, that had temporarily turned off funding for UNRWA as the investigation was ongoing have started that funding again, and I just don't understand how these fragile places like Jordan, Lebanon and Syria survive if UNRWA has only two months of funding at any given time without the United States playing a role, and without, frankly, a lot of our Gulf allies stepping up and filling the vacuum.”

PRYOR: “Thank you for that question. USAID does not fund UNRWA. However, we are looking, especially in places like Jordan and Lebanon, in which you do have refugee populations dependent upon UNRWA, on how we can better use our own assistance to help mitigate that impact. In both Jordan and Lebanon, we do a lot of work with host communities, which also has the added benefit of helping refugee populations as well. So, we will take a look and see what is it that we can do from our side, given that we don't fund UNRWA, to help soften the blow of the loss of our funding.”

MURPHY: “Right, but you are partners with all sorts of organizations that do work with UNRWA. You are in the same business. You must have a view as to the seriousness about UNRWA working on a budget right now that does not have enough cash flow to last more than 60 days.

PRYOR: “Yes, it is very concerning because this is not something we were able to budget for to be able to compensate for that.”

MURPHY: “You can’t fill in, USAID cannot fill in for the gap that has been created.”

PRYOR: “It would be extremely difficult for us to do that with the resources that we have.”

MURPHY: “Ambassador Leaf, Qatar has come under a lot of scrutiny, for good reason, since October 7th. But I misunderstand a lot of the animosity. Yes, they host Hamas, but my understanding is that that has been at our request. Yes, they have relations with the Taliban, but that has accrued to the benefit of the United States, utilized by Democratic and Republican administrations. They have previously been the conduit that flows funds into Gaza, done at the request of the Israeli government. So, just speak for a moment about the status of the U.S.-Qatar relationship right now, what the world would look like if we didn't have Qatar's ability to allow us to speak to our adversaries in the region.”

LEAF: “Thank you, Senator, for that important question. Having gone to Israel, I think nine times since October 7th, and actually my first two years in office, I did a lot of work with the Israelis especially on the Israeli security establishment. I would say that there has been, even before October 7th, there were very mixed feelings about the logic of using Qatar as a conduit for funds. But after October 7th, there has been the trauma that endures as long as hostages are kept by Hamas and other actors in Gaza. So there has been frustration from the same folks who understand that Qatar is a really critical channel, just as you say, alongside Egypt, and it has gifts that it brings, and influence it brings to bear on this. I would just say the following: Qatar, to use a somewhat tired expression, really does punch above its weight. It has a nimbleness of approach with a variety of actors that we don't have relations with, but that we need to communicate with. Regimes, as well as nonstate actors. And they have worked tirelessly on this hostage piece. There has been very understandable frustration from the families, from the Israeli government— ‘Can't Qatar do more? Can’t you, the U.S., put more pressure on Qatar to put more pressure on Hamas?’ And I would just say, as I did a few weeks ago before HFAC, there is the cadre of political officials of Hamas in Doha, and boy do they squeeze them, I can assure you they squeeze them, but at the end of the day, there is one guy 10 stories below the ground, a psychopath, messianic in his own belief that he is establishing himself in history, and there is sort of a sunk cost to having lost thousands of fighters and having caused carnage in Gaza. So Qatar's ability to do the indirect mediation is critical to our interest and to Israel's. I would say they have become a very trusted partner of ours.”

MURPHY: “There are other allies of the United States that have relations with Hamas. Qatar is the only one that seems to be willing to do the hardest work of convening these conversations. Listen—an imperfect ally, a human rights record that needs to get better. But I appreciate your comments. Let me ask you one bigger picture question. We have the outlines of a very important potential agreement in Lebanon to be able to move Hezbollah back off the border and maybe even get in a conversation about border demarcation. We have a political standstill in Yemen, with the added complication of Houthi provocations into the Red Sea. Both seem static until the Gaza conflict comes to a close. I just think it is important for this committee to understand that the end of the conflict in Gaza is important to be able to ultimately bring about a long-term security settlement with respect to Hamas' ability to hit Israel ever again. But it is also, right now, standing in the way of moving forward on a Yemen political process, on a de-escalation with the Houthis, and on a potential breakthrough in Lebanon. Am I right about that?”

LEAF: “You are absolutely right about all of that. Diplomacy continues even while we are working to get to that cease-fire agreement. Amos Hochstein is out in the region. He’s been out there for several days essentially working to calm things down. Things are quite volatile, alarmingly so. We heard that in stereophonic sound last week on our trip to the region. So, he is doing his work even ahead of a formal pause. Tim Lenderking is doing his work relentlessly, both in terms of the work with our partners on Red Sea security, but importantly, on the piece to get regional partners to really lean in hard on the Houthi. So all of this continues at pace, but you are right, the Gaza cease-fire will be the breakpoint where we can do something really important in both directions.”

MURPHY: “Let me sneak in one last question on Egypt. The State Department waived certification requirements tied to human rights improvements on the $235 million of Egypt’s FY22 FMF. But upon becoming Chair of the full committee, Senator Cardin put a hold on that funding. My impression is that since the Chairman's hold has been in place, the Egyptian government has really failed to engage in any meaningful cooperation with the United States on any of our core interests, and that we have further not seen any real progress with respect to the pretrial detention reforms or the release of significant numbers of political prisoners. It feels like, just like the amount of funding to Egypt has been stuck in place since the mid-1980's, progress with Egypt has been stuck at least for the past six months.”

LEAF: “The one thing I would say that is really, really important in this picture is the final resolution wrapping up entirely of Case 173. And the dismissal of charges, release of freezes, and detentions and so forth. This is a really significant step forward for all of the people and the organizations that were caught up in that years-long case. I asked just a couple days ago for a status report on the pretrial detention legislation, and I plan to go back to our post and see where we stand with that. The discussions that we had, as I recall, dimly, crested in September. And of course we had the events of October 7th, which unfortunately have thoroughly preoccupied our government, Egypt's government. They have been preoccupied both with the conflict right across their border with Sudan, but I assure you, we have not lost sight of that, and I will come back to you with some more comments on that.”

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